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Epistemic	Modal	Disagreement	October	18,	2015			ABSTRACT:		At	the	center	of	the	debate	between	contextualist	versus	relativist	semantics	for	epistemic	modal	claims	is	an	empirical	question	about	when	competent	subjects	judge	the	presence	of	epistemic	modal	disagreement.		John	MacFarlane’s	relativist	claims	that	we	judge	there	to	be	epistemic	modal	disagreement	across	the	widest	range	of	cases.		We	wish	to	dispute	the	robustness	of	his	data	with	the	results	of	two	studies.		Our	primary	conclusion	is	that	the	actual	disagreement	data	is	not	consistent	with	relativist	predictions,	and	so,	that	the	primary	motivation	for	relativism	disappears.		Our	study	differs	from	a	related	study	by	Knobe	and	Yalcin	(2014)	in	that	we	focus	directly	on	the	question	of	genuine	disagreement,	as	opposed	to	a	question	about	truth	or	the	appropriateness	of	retraction.		Some	of	our	findings	agree	with	theirs	about	relativism.			We	uncover	new	lessons	along	the	way,	including	that	there	are	widespread	situation	effects	of	epistemic	modal	discourse;	idiosyncratic	features	of	the	vignettes	significantly	influencing	judgments	about	epistemic	modal	disagreement.		We	reflect	with	mixed	feelings	on	the	prospects	for	contextualism	to	accommodate	our	findings.					The	contextualist	and	relativist	agree	that	the	truth	value	of	an	epistemic	possibility	claim	of	the	form			 “It	might/may	be	that	p”		is	 sensitive	 to	 the	 epistemic	 states	 of	 members	 of	 the	 relevant	 group.	 	 For	 the	contextualist	the	relevant	group	is	a	function	of	the	speaker's	context	of	utterance,	and	 for	 the	 relativist	 it	 is	 a	 function	 of	 the	 assessor’s	 point	 of	 evaluation	 of	 the	speaker's	utterance.		The	following	are	familiar	tokens	of	the	contrary	frameworks:		 (Contextualism)	“It	might/may	be	the	case	that	p”,	as	uttered	by	x	 in	 the	epistemic	sense,	 is	true	at	 the	relevant	point	of	assessment	 	 iff	 	p	 is	compatible	with	the	set	of	propositions	 known	by	 x	 (and	 perhaps	 her	 conversational	 partners)	 at	 the	world	and	time	of	utterance.			 (Relativism)	“It	might/may	be	the	case	that	p”,	as	uttered	by	x	in	the	epistemic	sense	and	assessed	by	y,	is	true	at	the	relevant	point	of	assessment	iff		p	is	compatible	with	 the	 set	 of	 propositions	 known	 by	 y	 at	 the	 world	 and	 time	 of	 y's	assessment	of	x's	utterance.				
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The	contextualist	 framework	(not	necessarily	 the	above	 instance)	 is	 the	dialectical	default,	 not	 only	 because	 (unlike	 relativism)	 it	 invokes	machinery	 that	 is	 already	familiar	in	formal	semantics	(e.g.,	in	the	received	view	of	indexicals,	demonstratives	and	 quantifiers),	 but	 also	 because	 epistemic	 modals	 (unlike,	 say,	 knowledge	attributions)	pass	with	flying	colors	standard	linguistic	tests	for	context	sensitivity.1			The	two	frameworks	agree	that	epistemic	modal	truth	values	swing	with	changes	in	epistemic	states,	but	disagree	on	whether	those	states	need	to	be	a	function	of	the	speaker’s	 context	 of	 use.	 	 Movement	 from	 the	 default	 contextualist	 position	 to	 a	more	exotic	relativist	framework	then	requires	forceful	motivation.	In	that	spirit	the	relativist	emphasizes	empirical	data	that	allegedly	only	she	can	accommodate.		The	most	fundamental	is	the	so-called	disagreement	data	(of	which	the	“eavesdropping	data”	is	a	special	case).				Eavesdropping	cases	put	the	two	speakers	at	a	distance.	For	instance,	Jane	is	at	the	bus	stop	wondering	where	her	bus	is,	and	says	to	her	friend,	“We	may	have	missed	the	bus.”		George,	who	is	also	at	the	bus	stop,	is	eavesdropping	and	mumbles,		“She's	wrong.		They	can't	have	missed	the	bus.	 	I've	been	here	for	an	hour	and	know	it	has	not	 come.”	 	 Our	 relativist,	 the	 brand	 that	 we	 will	 be	 criticizing,	 claims	 that	 the	natural	reading	is	that	our	eavesdropper,	George,	is	denying	Jane's	epistemic	modal	claim---that	literally,	George	and	Jane	cannot	simultaneously	speak	the	truth.		They	genuinely	disagree.2						The	 view	 is	 that	 the	 relativist,	 but	 not	 the	 contextualist,	 can	 straightforwardly	accommodate	 the	 eavesdropping	 data.	 After	 all,	 p	 is	 compatible	 with	 the	 set	 of	propositions	known	by	the	speaker	(and	her	group),	and	the	eavesdropper	does	not	dispute	that.		By	contrast,	p	is	not	compatible	with	what	the	assessor	knows,	when	the	assessor	is	the	eavesdropper.		The	relativist	concludes	that	her	own	framework,	even	if	exotic,	is	superior	to	the	dialectical	default	at	explaining	such	basic	epistemic	modal	talk.		This	paper	provides	new	data	to	the	dispute.	 	We	do	not	rehearse	the	full	range	of	criticisms	 that	 have	 been	 waged	 for	 and	 against	 the	 two	 positions.	 	 Nor	 do	 we	discuss	 all	 the	 positions	 that	 fall	 under	 these	 two	 general	 categories.	 Instead	 we	wish	to	evaluate	the	robustness	of	the	disagreement	data	in	particular,	since	it	has	been	highlighted	as	a	primary	motivation	for	relativism.		We	evaluate	the	empirical	question	of	when	subjects	take	speakers	to	disagree	about	epistemic	modal	matters.		When	 is	 the	 disagreement-reading	 available	 to	 competent	 native	 ears?	 Note	 that,	because	 disagreement	 questions	 require	 complex	 assessments	 of	 situations,	 these	data	 undoubtedly	 reflect	 several	 factors	 beyond	 semantic	 competence.	 This	 is,	indeed,	likely	to	be	the	case	in	any	experimental	investigation	of	complex	cognitive																																																									1	We	have	in	mind	here	the	binding	test,	and	the	licensing	test	in	particular.		Cf	Jonathan	Schaffer	(2009)	on	epistemic	modals		and	Jason	Stanley	(2005b,	Chapter	3)	on	knowledge-attributions.		2	The	familiar	line	is	developed	in	Andy	Egan,	John	Hawthorne,	&	Brian	Weatherson	(2005),	Egan	(2007),	and	in	John	MacFarlane	(2011).	
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phenomena.	 We	 contend	 that	 we	 can	 still	 learn	 something	 about	 semantic	competence	in	the	face	of	this	variation	in	other	factors,	however.	In	particular,	the	second	experiment	reported	here	attempts	to	factor	out	a	number	of	non-semantic	aspects	 of	 the	 broader	 context	 and	 still	 finds	 some	 robust	 differences	 in	disagreement	intuitions,	even	in	the	face	of	substantial	‘situational’	variation	that	is	unrelated	to	the	interpretation	of	epistemic	modals	per	se.			 	There	are	other	related	characterizations	of	 the	data	that	are	said	to	be	 in	need	of	explanation.	 	 For	 instance,	 there	 is	 y’s	 (and	our)	 inclination	 to	 judge	x’s	 epistemic	modal	claim	as	false,	and	there	is	x’s	alleged	inclination	to	retract	her	initial	modal	claim	 in	 response	 to	 y’s	 overt	 denial.3		 However,	 the	 disagreement	 data	 is	 more	fundamental.	 	 If	we	are	 inclined	to	 judge	x	and	y	as	genuinely	disagreeing	over	an	epistemic	modal	matter	(in	the	sense	that	x	and	y	cannot	both	speak	the	truth),	then	that	would	explain	why	we	(and	y)	are	inclined	to	judge	x	as	having	said	something	false	(in	light	of	y’s	better	epistemic	position).		And	it	would	explain	our	inclination	to	judge	it	appropriate	for	x	to	retract	her	initial	claim	(once	appraised	of	y’s	better	epistemic	 position).	 The	 converse	 is	 not	 the	 case.	 For	 instance,	 there	 is	 a	 natural	socio-pragmatic	explanation	of	y’s	inclination	to	(mistakenly)	judge	x	as	having	said	something	 false---e.g.,	 in	 terms	of	y’s	confusion	as	 to	whether	x	 is	using	the	modal	epistemically	 or	 counterfactually.4		 Such	 “slippage”	 in	 interpretation	 on	 y’s	 part	 is	not	readily	converted	into	an	explanation	of	why	we	take	x	and	y	to	be	engaged	in	a	genuine	dispute		(if/when	we	do).		After	all,	on	the	slippage	account,	x	and	y	are	not	in	 dispute;	 	 x	 expressed	 an	 epistemic	 modality,	 but	 y	 disputed	 a	 counterfactual	modality.			Similarly,	 not	 all	 explanations	 of	 appropriateness	 of	 retraction	 convert	 into	 an	understanding	 of	 judgments	 about	 disagreement.	 	 	 Knobe	 and	 Yalcin	 (2014)	 for	instance	 suggest	 that	 speakers	 sometimes	 retract	 epistemic	 modal	 claims,	 not	because	 they	 think	 their	 claim	 is	 false,	 but	 rather	 because	 they	 no	 longer	wish	 to	make	its	contribution	to	the	common	ground.		Such	cases	tell	us	nothing	about	why	
we	take	x	and	y	 to	be	engaged	 in	a	genuine	dispute	(if/when	we	do).	 	For	such	an	explanation	of	the	retraction	does	not	even	suppose	that	x	has	said	something	false,	but	rather	that	x	withdraws	a	certain	contribution	from	the	background.			We	focus	on	the	disagreement	question	also	because	retraction	data	is	obviously	not	available	 in	 the	more	 decisive	 eavesdropping	 cases.	 In	 the	 eavesdropping	 cases	 x	cannot	retract	in	light	of	y’s	more	informed	perspective	because	she	is	unaware	of	y’s	 perspective.	 States	 of	 disagreement	 between	 two	 parties,	 by	 contrast,	 can	 be	evaluated	even	if	the	parties	are	unaware	of	each	other.		Section	 1	 rehearses	 MacFarlane’s	 problem	 of	 lost	 disagreement.	 	 If	 MacFarlane	 is	correct,	 then	 for	 any	 (interesting)	 brand	 of	 contextualism	 C,	 there	 is	 a	 modal																																																									3	These	are	among	the	data	studied	in	Knobe	and	Yalcin	(2014).		4	Hawthorne	(2009)	gives	a	version	of	this	sort	of	explanation.	
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epistemic	 disagreement	 that	 C	 cannot	 explain.5		 	 Section	 2	 is	 an	 examination	 of	MacFarlane’s	 target	 notion	 of	 disagreement.	 If	 the	 notion	 is	 sufficiently	 clear	 and	characterizes	a	 state	 that	 is	 tracked	by	 intuitive	 judgments,	 then	 it	 can	 inform	 the	question	of	how	to	test	empirically	for	the	presence	of	this	semantic	phenomenon.		For	readers	already	 familiar	with	the	“arguments	 from	lost	disagreement”	and	the	target	 notion	of	 disagreement	 (i.e.	 the	 preclusion	 of	 join	 accuracy),	we	 encourage	skipping	 ahead	 to	 Section	 3,	 where	 we	 discuss	 the	 data	 collected	 from	 our	 two	studies.		In	both	of	our	studies		subjects	take	there	to	be	much	less	epistemic	modal	disagreement	 than	 relativism	predicts.	 	Other	 lessons	are	drawn.	 	For	 instance,	 in	Study	 2	we	 find	 that	 the	 conversational	 relation	 (e.g.,	 being	 in	 same	 conversation	versus	 being	 in	 a	 remote	 eavesdropping	 scenario)	 has	 less	 effect	 on	 peoples’	judgments	about	disagreement	than	does	the	non-modal	subject	matter	and	setting	(e.g.,	FBI	surveillance	scenario	about	a	person’s	location	versus	a	classroom	setting	about	a	score	on	a	math	test).		Study	1	can	be	understood	to	support	contextualism	up	to	a	point,	however	Study	2	leaves	us	with	more	questions	than	answers	about	the	correct	theory	of	our	epistemic	modal	talk.			
1.	The	Problem	of	Lost	Disagreement	The	point	of	this	section	is	to	demonstrate	the	problem	of	lost	disagreement,	which	is	 the	 centerpiece	 in	 MacFarlane’s	 argument	 against	 contextualism	 in	 favor	 of	relativism.	 	 There	 are	 multiple	 drafts	 of	 the	 argument,	 one	 for	 each	 version	 of	contextualism	 that	MacFarlane	 considers.	The	essential	 structure	quickly	becomes	clear.	Each	argument	begins	with	a	person	x	making	an	epistemic	modal	claim,	“it	
might	 be	 that	p”,	 for	 some	 contingent	 proposition	 p,	 and	 another	 relevantly	more	informed	person	y	uttering	a	syntactic	denial	of	x’s	utterance---for	instance,	“It	can’t	be	that	p”.		We	are	asked	to	consult	our	pre-theoretic	intuitions	and	notice	and	x	and	y	 are	 in	 a	 state	 of	 genuine	 disagreement---i.e.,	 that	 they	 dispute	 some	 epistemic	modal	matter,	in	the	sense	that	they	cannot	both	speak	the	truth.		The	final	stage	of	the	 argument	 demonstrates	 that	 the	 version	 of	 contextualism	 in	 play	 does	 not	predict	a	disagreement	in	that	scenario,	for	it	does	not	issue	enough	shared	content	between	x	and	y	to	ground	a	genuine	dispute.		Rather,	it	interprets	x	and	y	in	such	a	way	that	they	may	both	speak	the	truth.				We	begin	with	solipsistic	contextualism.	 	 It	 is	solipsistic	 in	 that	 it	says	that	all	and	only	the	speaker’s	knowledge	is	relevant	for	the	proper	evaluation	of	a	might-claim.			
Solipsistic	Contextualism,	or	(SC),	says		 (SC)		“It	might	be	that	p”	is	true	as	uttered	by	x	(at	 time	t)	 	 	 iff	 	p	is	compatible	with	K,																																																										5	More	specifically,	he	concludes	that,	for	any	brand	of	contextualism	C,	either	(i)	it	is	unclear	how	speakers	can	take	themselves	to	be	suitably	placed	to	make	a	might-claim	or	(ii)	there	is	a	modal	epistemic	disagreement	that	C	cannot	explain.		So	we	read	“interesting”	as	“any	account	for	which	it	is	clear	how	speakers	can	take	themselves	to	be	suitably	placed	to	assert	a	might-claim”.		
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where	K	is	the	set	of	propositions	known	by	x	(at	time	t).6				Minimally,	 contextualists	 take	 the	 truth-value	 of	 the	 might-claim	 to	 turn	 on	 the	knowledge	 in	 question	 (in	 this	 case,	 the	 speaker’s	 knowledge).	 Typically	contextualists	will	make	the	stronger	claim	that	the	knowledge	in	question	plays	a	content-determining	role	as	well.		Our	thoughts	about	contextualism	will	not	decide	between	 these	 differences,	 since	 for	 the	 case	 of	 non-embedded	 epistemic	modals	(and	 their	 negations)	 the	 corresponding	 contextualist	 positions	 predict	 the	 same	truth	 values,	 and	 so,	 the	 same	 verdicts	 about	 genuine	 dispute.	 However,	 by	“contextualism”	we	will	refer	to	the	stronger	position	throughout.				The	argument	from	disagreement	against	(SC)	is	a	one-two	punch	that	goes	like	this:			
	
Punch	 1:	 A	 dialog	 is	 presented	 in	which	 an	 apparent	 epistemic	modal	 dispute	 is	exhibited	between	speakers,	in	this	case	between	Sally	and	George:		(Boston)		Sally	 and	 George	 are	 discussing	 Joe's	 whereabouts.	 Sally	 says,	 "Joe	might	be	in	Boston."		George	replies,	"Joe	can’t	be	in	Boston.	I	just	had	breakfast	with	him	here	in	Los	Angeles	30	minutes	ago."7		That	 is,	 we	 are	 asked	 to	 consult	 our	 intuitions,	 and	 notice	 that	 we	 pick	 up	 on	 a	genuine	 (epistemic	modal)	disagreement	between	Sally	and	George.	 	The	 sense	of	“disagreement”	 is	meant	here	 to	be	a	non-technical	notion---in	 the	 sense	 that	 it	 is	something	that	ordinary	non-philosophers	of	language	are	capable	of	tracking.				
Punch	 2:	 It	 is	 claimed	 that	 (SC)	 cannot	 explain	 the	 disagreement.	 	 After	 all,	according	to	(SC),	Sally	is	claiming	that,	for	all	Sally	knows,	Joe	might	be	in	Boston.		And	George	is	denying	that,	for	all	George	knows,	Joe	might	be	in	Boston.		On	these	readings,	there	is	no	dispute.		Hence,	(SC)	does	not	accommodate	a	pretty	ordinary	case	of	epistemic	modal	disagreement.				Arguably,	on	 the	 (SC)	 reading,	disagreement	 is	not	even	possible---or	at	 least	 it	 is	not	possible	to	have	a	modal	epistemic	disagreement	via	an	affirmation	and	a	denial	of	a	free-standing	epistemic	modal	claim.		The	state	of	asserting,	while	someone	else	is	denying,	an	unmodified,	unembedded	epistemic	modal-claim	cannot	constitute	a	disagreement,	because	by	(SC)	such	utterances	are	always	about	the	states	of	their	users.		Multiple	users	implies	multiple	subject	matters.																																																												6	This	is	not	the	most	careful	formulation	of	the	position.		It	obviously	cannot	handle	epistemic	possibilities	that	are	not	logically	possible.		To	resolve	this,	one	usually	reads	“x	does	not	know	not-p”	for	“p	is	compatible	with	what	s	knows”.		If	the	reader	wishes,	she	may	substitute.				7	The	example	is	borrowed	and	modified	from	MacFarlane	(2011:	147-149).	
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The	 obvious	 response	 to	 the	 above	 argument,	 which	 MacFarlane	 foreshadows,	 is	that	contextualism	is	not	solipsistic.		It	is	not	only	about	the	speaker’s	knowledge.			Historically,	 we	 do	 not	 find	 many	 solipsists.	 	 Compare,	 G.E.	 Moore	 (1962:	 279),	Hacking	 (1967:	 153),	 Teller	 (1972:	 312),	 Kratzer	 (1977)	 and	DeRose	 (1991:	593-594).	 	 We	 see	 that	 these	 earliest	 expressions	 of	 contextualism	 about	 epistemic	modals	 are	 indeed	 non-solipsistic.	 	 Among	 these,	 Hacking	 is	 least	 obviously	 non-solipsistic.	 	 However	 see	DeRose	 (1991:	 587-588)	 for	 a	 non-solipsistic	 reading	 of	Hacking.	 	 	MacFarlane	 (2011:	 150,	 n.4)	 points	 out,	 by	 contrast,	 that	 Jason	 Stanley	(2005a:	128)	appears	to	be	a	solipsist.	Notice	also	that	Robert	Stalnaker	(1984:	143)	is	solipsistic.8					The	 foregoing	 argument	 is	 useful	 to	 elucidate	 the	 structure	 of	 MacFarlane’s	argument	 against	 any	 brand	 of	 contextualism,	 even	 flexible	 non-solipsistic	contextualisms.	 	 Perhaps	 your	 favorite	 brand	 of	 contextualism	 says	 that	 a	might-claim	that	p	 is	 true	 just	 in	case	p	is	compatible	with	what	 is	known	collectively	by	the	 speaker	 and	 her	 conversational	 partners.	 Call	 this	 Conversational	 Group	
Contextualism	(CGC):		 (CGC)		“It	might	be	that	p”	is	true	as	uttered	by	x	(at	 time	t)	 	 	 iff	 	p	is	compatible	with	K,		where	 K	 is	 the	 set	 of	 propositions	 collectively	 known	 by	 x	 and	 her	conversational	partners	(at	time	t).		To	 reload	 the	 argument	 from	 disagreement,	 just	 modify	 the	 early	 dialog	 so	 that	George	 is	 not	 part	 of	 the	 conversation	 when	 Sally	 speaks,	 but	 instead	 is	eavesdropping	nearby:		 (Local	Eavesdropper)			Sally	says	to	her	friend	Jane,	“Joe	might	be	in	Boston”.		Then	George	(who	is	eavesdropping	in	the	closet)	jumps	out	and	says,	“You	are	wrong!		It’s	false	that	he	might	be	in	Boston.	I	just	saw	him	down	the	hall.”9		Here	comes	the	one-two	punch.	First,	the	intuition	is	supposed	to	be	that	Jane	and	Sally	 disagree	 about	 whether	 Joe	 might	 be	 in	 Boston.	 	 Second,	 notice	 that	 the	aforementioned	 brand	 of	 contextualism	 cannot	 explain	 this.	 	 According	 to	 that	theory,	 Sally’s	 claim	 is	 only	 about	 her	 knowledge	 and	 the	 knowledge	 of	 her	conversational	partner,	Jane.	George	was	not	a	conversational	partner	because	(for																																																									8	At	least	one	of	us,	the	present	authors,	is	sympathetic	to	solipsism.		We	reflect	in	the	final	section	on	how	a	solipsist	might	think	about	our	findings.						9	The	example	is	modified	from	MacFarlane	(2011:	151).		Incidentally,	he	uses	the	case	to	motivate	retraction	data,	rather	than	disagreement	data.		Our	use	should	not	be	contested.		From	the	relativist’s	point	of	view,	it	is	only	because	Sally	and	George	cannot	both	be	right	(from	any	one	point	of	assessment)	that	a	retraction	on	Sally’s	part	would	be	warranted	in	light	of	George’s	more	informed	claim.	
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whatever	 immature	 reason)	 he	 was	 hiding	 in	 the	 closet	 at	 the	 time	 of	 Sally’s	utterance.	 So	Sally	 claimed	 that	 Joe’s	being	 is	Boston	 is	 compatible	with	what	 she	and	 Jane	 collectively	 know.	 	 And	 George	 denied	 that	 Joe’s	 being	 in	 Boston	 is	compatible	with	what	he,	Sally	and	Jane	collectively	know.	 	Those	are	two	distinct	subject	matters,	and	so,	Sally	and	George	are	talking	past	one	another.		Indeed,	they	may	both	speak	the	truth,	and	so,	(CGC)	fails	to	accommodate	the	dispute.			At	 this	point	 the	 contextualist	has	a	number	of	moves.	 	 For	 instance	 she	 can	deny	that	there	is	a	decisive	disagreement-intuition	or	she	can	deny	that	the	above	form	of	 contextualism	 is	 flexible	enough.	 	We	will	 revisit	 the	disagreement	 intuitions	 in	Section	3.		Let	us	here	follow	MacFarlane’s	response	to	an	increase	in	flexibility.			Here	 is	one	way	 to	 increase	 flexibility.	 	 Note	 that	 conversations	do	not	occur	at	 a	time,	but	at	 a	 time-span.	 	Perhaps	a	plausible	contextualism	should	 reflect	 this	by	claiming	that	a	might-claim	that	p	is	true	when	and	only	when	p	is	compatible	with	what	 is	 known	 by	 anyone	 who	 engages	 with	 the	 speaker	 or	 participates	 in	 the	conversation.		Such	a	theory	may	allow	for	the	relevance	of	local	eavesdroppers.		For	it	dictates	that	they	are	relevant	when	in	fact	they	join	the	conversation.				A	 weaker	 version	 of	 the	 restriction	 would	 dictate	 the	 relevance	 of	 anybody	 in	 a	
position	to	join	the	conversation.	Call	it	(CGC-2)	to	indicate	that	it	is	another	brand	of	Conversational	Group	Contextualism.				 (CGC-2)		“It	might	be	that	p”	is	true	as	uttered	by	x	(in	a	conversation	that	spans	t1-tn)			iff		p	is	compatible	with	K,		where	K	is	the	set	of	propositions	collectively	known	by	x	and	anyone	in	a	position	to	join	the	conversation	(between	t1	and	tn).		This	sort	of	move	invites	an	instance	of	a	charge,	found	at	MacFarlane	(2011:	152),	that	if	we	can	include	the	knowledge	of	local	eavesdroppers	as	relevant	to	a	might-claim,	then	it	is	less	clear	why	anyone	would	take	themselves	to	be	in	a	position	to	make	a	might-claim.	 	For	 they	would	have	 to	have	views	about	what	 is	known	by	would-be	eavesdroppers,	whose	existence	they	may	not	even	be	aware	of.		However,	this	 instance	 of	 the	 charge	would	 be	 overstated.	 	 For	 typically	 there	 are	 no	 local	eavesdroppers	(or	local	eavesdroppers	in	a	position	to	join	the	conversation).		And	barring	any	good	reason	to	think	there	are	some,	we	are	in	a	position	reasonably	to	suppose	that	there	are	none.			MacFarlane’s	central	argument	against	such	flexibility	is	one	more	variation	on	our	now	well-rehearsed	argument	 from	lost	disagreement.	 	The	variation	modifies	 the	dialog	 to	 include	 a	 remote	 eavesdropper---a	 listener	 who	 essentially	 is	 not	 in	 a	position	to	join	in	the	speaker’s	conversation.	 	For	MacFarlane	(2011:	151)	claims,	“you’d	assess	[Sally’s]	claim	the	same	way	if	[the	eavesdropper]	were	thousands	of	miles	away,	listening	through	a	wiretap.”		Here’s	a	case	of	that	kind:		
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(Remote	Eavesdropper)		Sally	 says	 to	a	 friend,	 “Joe	might	be	 in	Boston”,	 and	FBI	agent	Frank	(who	 is	 eavesdropping	 by	 wiretap	 from	 a	 great	 distance)	 thinks	 to	himself,	“Wrong!		It’s	false	that	he	might	be	in	Boston.	I	just	saw	him	in	Berkeley	20	minutes	ago.”10				Again	comes	the	one-two	punch.		First	it	is	alleged	that	our	intuition	is	that	Sally	and	Frank	 dispute	 an	 epistemic	 modal	 fact.	 Second,	 it	 is	 noticed	 that	 (CGC-2)	 cannot	accommodate	 that	 dispute.	 	 After	 all,	 Frank	 is	 not	 in	 a	 position	 to	 join	 Sally’s	conversation.		So	his	knowledge	is	not	relevant	to	the	content	or	truth	value	of	her	claim.	 	Once	again	we	find	that,	on	the	contextualist	view	in	question,	our	subjects	are	talking	past	one	another.		They	may	both	speak	the	truth,	and	therefore,	are	not	in	a	state	of	disagreement.			MacFarlane	 sums	 up	 his	 thoughts	 about	 the	 contextualist	 strategy	 of	 increased	flexibility:			 So	 far,	 the	move	 away	 from	 solipsism	 seems	well-motivated	 and	 plausible.	The	 problem	 is	 that	 once	 we	 let	 data	 about	 third-party	 assessments	 …	motivate	 an	 expansion	 of	 the	 contextually	 relevant	 group	 to	 include	 more	than	just	the	speaker,	there	is	no	way	to	stop	this	machine.	The	same	kind	of	arguments	that	motivate	expanding	the	relevant	group	of	knowers	to	include	George	 (in	 our	 [Local	 Eavesdropper]	 example	 above)	 will	 motivate	expanding	the	relevant	group	of	knowers	to	 include	anybody	who	will	ever	consider	the	claim.11				It	is	only	because	MacFarlane	takes	us	to	judge	a	disagreement	between	the	speaker	claiming	 that	might-p	 and	 anyone	who	will	 ever	 consider	 that	 claim	 (who	 knows	not-p)	that	he	would	claim	that	the	contextualist	needs	to	 include	such	persons	as	part	 of	 the	 relevant	 group.	 	 But	 that	 is	 a	 questionable	 assumption.	 	Whether	 any	such	 person	 really	 is	 in	 a	 state	 of	 disagreement	 with	 the	 speaker	 (or	 that	 we	intuitively	 judge	 so)	 is	 yet	 to	 be	 seen.	 	 We	 dispute	 the	 claim	 in	 Section	 3	 with	empirical	 data.	 	 However,	 before	 we	 move	 on,	 let	 us	 examine	 just	 how	 serious	MacFarlane’s	expansion-conclusion	would	be	for	contextualism,	if	it	were	true---that	is,	 if	 the	 disagreement-judgment	 were	 as	 consistent	 across	 the	 entire	 class	 of	structurally	similar	cases.					The	resulting	contextualist	proposal	would	have	to	say	that	“might-p”	is	true	just	in	case	 p	 is	 compatible	with	what	 is	 known	 by	 anybody	who	will	 ever	 consider	 the	claim.		Of	course,	on	this	view	it	is	not	clear	why	anyone	would	ever	think	they	are	in	a	position	 to	assert	 a	might-claim.	 	 It	 amounts	 to	 claiming,	 in	 cases	where	we	are																																																									10	Remote	eavesdropping	cases	are	considered	also	in	Egan	(2007)	and	Wright	(2007).		The	former,	but	not	the	latter,	is	in	agreement	with	MacFarlane	on	the	force	of	this	sort	of	case.			11	MacFarlane	(2011:	151).	
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ignorant	about	whether	p,	 that	nobody	who	will	ever	consider	this	claim	will	ever	know	not-p.		We	are	generally	never	in	a	position	to	assert	that.		So	if	MacFarlane	is	correct,	then	contextualism	entails	a	general	unassertibility	thesis.			These	 considerations	 would	 also	 strap	 the	 contextualist	 with	 semantic	
unknowability.	 	 A	 speaker	 is	 afflicted	 with	 this	 ailment	 when	 there	 is	 no	 way	 in	principle	for	her	to	know	what	she	is	expressing	at	the	time	of	her	utterance.		Since	on	 the	 view	 we	 are	 considering,	 the	 content	 of	 an	 epistemic	 modal	 claim	 is	determined	at	least	in	part	by	the	epistemic	states	of	subjects	who	will	consider	the	claim	 in	 the	 future,	 and	 it	 is	 usually	 unknowable	 to	 the	 speaker	 at	 the	 time	 of	utterance	 which	 people	 will	 eventually	 consider	 her	 claim,	 it	 follows	 that	 the	speaker	 at	 the	 time	 of	 utterance	 is	 usually	 not	 in	 a	 position	 to	 know	what	 she	 is	expressing.				Another	 unacceptable	 consequence	 of	MacFarlane’s	 expansion-conclusion	may	 be	
semantic	nihilism,	 depending	on	one’s	metaphysics	of	 the	 future.	 	This	 is	 the	view	that	our	might-claims	do	not	have	any	semantic	content,	given	the	non-existence	of	the	 future.	 	 For	 the	 content	 of	 our	might-claims	 then	 depends	 on	 something	 that	does	not	yet	 exist	 (viz.,	 future	 circumstances	 in	which	people	are	 considering	our	might-claims).		Alternatively,	semantic	instability	threatens	if	a	single	utterance	at	a	given	time	has	a	content	that	changes	later	as	more	and	more	people	consider	that	past	 utterance.	 	 Those	 are	 a	 few	 potential	 variations	 on	 the	 bizarre	 nature	 of	epistemic	modal	 content,	 if	 in	 fact	 the	 content	 of	 a	 presently	 expressed	 epistemic	modal	claim	depends	on	what	happens	in	the	future.			And	 if	 we	 read	MacFarlane’s	 “anyone	who	will	 ever	 consider	 the	 claim”	 as	 being	about	 both	 actual	 and	 possible	 subjects,	 then	 an	 even	 more	 catastrophic	consequence	 emerges	 for	 a	 contextualist	 that	 accepts	 MacFarlane’s	 disagreement	data.	 	Epistemic	possibility	more	or	less	collapses	into	metaphysical	necessity.	 	For	let	 x	 stand	 in	 a	 transworld	 relation	 to	 y.	 	 Then	 given	 the	 usual	 set-up	 of	 the	argument,	x	and	y	disagree.	 	Hence,	 the	contextualist	 is	committed	to	a	very	weak	notion	of	“relevant	group”.	 	It	includes	anyone	that	considers	the	claim	and	knows	not-p---anywhere	at	 any	 time	 in	any	world.	 	 	The	upshot	 is	 that	 “might(p)”	will	be	true	at	a	context	of	use	 if	and	only	if	 it	 is	 impossible	 to	know	not-p.	 	Putting	aside	Fitch-paradoxical	propositions	(like	‘p	but	nobody	ever	knows	p’),	it	is	impossible	to	know	 not-p	 just	 in	 case	 p	 is	 necessary.	 	 Therefore,	 at	 least	 for	 all	 non-Fitch	paradoxical	p,	a	might-claim	that	p	will	be	true	just	in	case	p	is	necessary.			In	 sum,	 if	(i)	MacFarlane’s	 disagreement	 data	 is	 robust,	 and	 (ii)	 the	 disagreement	intuitions	 that	 motivate	 expanding	 the	 relevant	 group	 of	 knowers	 at	 all	 also	motivate	expanding	the	relevant	group	to	 include	anybody	who	will	ever	consider	the	claim,	 then	contextualism	is	 in	deep	trouble.	 	The	 foundation	of	 the	argument,	however,	 is	 the	disagreement	data.	 	So	 if	MacFarlane’s	data	 is	not	robust	(and	the	disagreement	 intuitions	 are	 not	 as	 widespread	 as	 he	 suggests),	 then	 the	contextualist	 is	 not	 pressured	 to	 expand	 the	 relevant	 group	so	 radically.	 	 She	 can	stop	the	MacFarlanean	machine	before	it	dooms	her	thesis.			
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2.	The	Preclusion	of	Joint	Accuracy	Disagreement,	in	MacFarlane’s	(2009:	4)	target	sense,	is	a	state	and	not	an	activity.		He	is	interested	in	the	sense	in	which	people	disagree,	and	not	in	a	sense	in	which	people	are	having	a	disagreement.		The	latter	he	claims	is	what	people	do	when	they	take	 themselves	 to	 be	 in	 a	 state	 of	 disagreement,	 and	 for	 this	 reason	 is	 less	fundamental	 than	 the	 state	 of	 disagreement.	 	 Having	 a	 disagreement,	MacFarlane	points	 out,	 depends	 on	 peoples’	 actions	 and	 attitudes	 towards	 each	 other.	 By	contrast,	 a	 state	 of	disagreement	depends	only	 on	 their	 first-order	 attitudes,	 such	that	 people	 can	 be	 in	 a	 state	 of	 disagreement	 even	 if	 they	 do	 not	 know	 of	 each	other’s	 existence.	 	 Two	 people	may	 be	 in	 a	 state	 of	 disagreement	without	 taking	themselves	to	be	in	that	state,	and	two	people	may	take	themselves	to	be	in	state	of	disagreement	when	in	fact	they	are	not	in	that	state.			Moreover,	MacFarlane	is	interested	in	a	kind	of	disagreement	that	we	can	track	and	have	intuitive	judgments	about.		After	all,	relativism	is	alleged	to	explain,	better	than	contextualism,	why	we	have	the	intuitive	judgments	that	we	have	about	when	there	is	and	when	there	is	not	a	epistemic	modal	dispute.		If	we	do	not	track	the	relevant	state,	 then	 relativism	 does	 not	 explain	 our	 overt	 judgments	 about	 the	 state.	 One	must	 then	 take	 care	 when	 testing	 these	 judgments	 that	 our	 subjects	 are	 indeed	tracking	the	relevant	state,	and	not	reporting	on	something	else,	like	the	activity	of	disagreeing.	 	After	all,	presumably	people	are	able	 to	 track	both,	 and	we	wish	our	data	to	bear	on	the	contextualism-	debate	that	MacFarlane	is	framing.			MacFarlane	 (2007:	 22-23;	 2009:	 11-13)	 asks	 us	 to	 depart	 from	 the	 traditional	notion	of	disagreement,	which	says	that	 two	parties	are	 in	a	state	of	disagreement	just	 in	case	the	one	accepts	 the	very	same	proposition	that	 the	other	rejects.	 	This	phenomenon	 by	 itself	 does	 not	 always	 generate	 a	 disagreement	 in	 the	 relevant	sense.	 	 Consider	 the	 case	 where	 I	 affirm	 that	 Obama	 is	 president,	 while	 my	counterpart	 in	 an	 altogether	 different	 possible	 world	 (where	 Obama	 lost	 the	election)	correctly	denies	that	Obama	is	president.		Although	I	affirm	the	very	same	proposition	that	my	counterpart	denies,	you	do	not	judge	my	counterpart	and	I	to	be	in	a	state	of	disagreement.	There	is	no	substantial	dispute	between	us.		We	can	both	be	right	because	both	of	our	claims	are	accurate.			In	the	above	example,	my	affirmation	that	Obama	is	president	is	true	relative	to	the	circumstance	 of	 evaluation	 that	 matters	 for	 the	 proper	 assessment	 of	 that	affirmation	 (i.e.,	 relative	 to	 the	 actual	 world),	 while	 my	 counterpart’s	 denial	 that	Obama	 is	president	 is	 true	 relative	 to	 the	 circumstance	of	 evaluation	 that	matters	for	 the	 proper	 assessment	 of	 his	 claim	 (i.e.,	 relative	 to	 my	 counterpart’s	 merely	possible	world).		From	your	current	point	of	assessment,	both	claims	are	accurate---in	the	sense	that	each	is	true	relative	to	the	circumstance	of	evaluation	that	matters	for	 its	proper	 assessment.	 	 That	 is	why,	 on	MacFarlane’s	 view,	 you	may	 correctly	judge	 that	 the	 two	parties	 are	 not	 in	 a	 state	 of	 disagreement,	 even	 though	 one	 is	affirming	the	very	proposition	that	the	other	is	denying.	That	is,	from	your	point	of	assessment,	 their	 claims	 are	 both	 accurate.	 For	MacFarlane	 (2007:	 26),	 there	 is	 a	
	 11	
genuine	disagreement	in	the	target	sense,	only	if	from	the	given	point	of	assessment	the	accuracy	of	one	claim	(or	attitude)	precludes	the	accuracy	of	the	other.		MacFarlane’s	development	of	the	notion	of	accuracy	is	debate-neutral	in	a	number	of	respects.		We	say,			 An	acceptance	(rejection)	is	accurate	 just	in	case	the	proposition	accepted	is	 true	 (false)	 at	 the	 circumstance	 of	 evaluation	 that	 is	 relevant	 to	 the	assessment	of	the	acceptance	(rejection)	in	its	context….		(2007:	23)		The	 notion	 does	 not	 presuppose	 answers	 to	 interesting	 questions	 about	 which	circumstance	 is	relevant	 to	 the	proper	assessment	of	 the	target	utterances.	 	So	 for	instance,	if	the	circumstance	that	is	relevant	to	the	assessment	of	my	utterance	“Bob	is	sitting”	is	the	world	w	and	time	t	of	my	utterance,	as	advocated	by	a	temporalist	about	 propositions,	 then	 that	 utterance	 is	 accurate	 just	 in	 case	 the	 proposition	expressed	by	“Bob	is	sitting”	is	true	at	<w,	t>.	 	By	contrast,	an	eternalist	like	Frege,	believes	 that	 a	 contingent	 proposition	 is	 about,	 among	 other	 things,	 the	 time	 of	utterance.	“Bob	is	sitting”,	as	uttered	at	time	t,	expresses	the	proposition	that	Bob	is	sitting	at	 t.	Accordingly	the	circumstance	that	 is	relevant	 to	 the	assessment	of	 that	utterance	 is	 merely	 the	 world	 of	 utterance.	 	 If	 the	 eternalist	 is	 right,	 then	 my	utterance,	“Bob	is	sitting”,	is	accurate	just	in	case	the	proposition	expressed	is	true	at	 the	 world	 of	 utterance.	 	 The	 contrast	 is	 between	 whether	 the	 contextually	relevant	feature,	in	this	case	a	time	of	utterance,	is	built	into	the	content	of	the	claim	or	its	circumstance	of	evaluation.			In	 the	 case	 of	 epistemic	 modals	 there	 is	 a	 further	 contrast.	 	 Not	 only	 does	 our	contextualist	 and	 MacFarlane’s	 relativist	 differ	 on	 whether	 the	 relevant	 state	 of	information	 plays	 a	 content-determining	 role	 versus	 a	 circumstance-determining	role,	they	differ	also	on	what	they	take	to	be	the	relevant	state	of	information.		Our	contextualist	takes	the	relevant	epistemic	state	to	be	some	function	of	the	speaker’s	use,	 while	 MacFarlane’s	 relativist	 essentially	 takes	 it	 to	 be	 a	 function	 of	 the	assessor’s	assessment	of	that	use.		Since	the	two	positions	differ	on	both	the	content	and	 the	 relevant	 circumstance	of	 evaluation	of	 a	given	epistemic	modal	utterance,	there	are	at	least	two	possible	reasons	why	they	may	differ	on	their	verdicts	about	the	accuracy	of	such	an	utterance.		They	may	differ	on	the	proposition	expressed	or	on	the	circumstance	that	matters.		But	nothing	in	the	notion	of	accuracy	appears	to	beg	the	question	one	way	rather	than	the	other	on	either	of	these	fronts.		MacFarlane’s	 (2009:	10)	 target	 sense	of	disagreement,	preclusion	of	 joint	accuracy	(PJA),	 depends	 on	 the	 notion	 of	 accuracy	 and	 is	 intended	 to	 be	 debate-neutral	 as	well.		(PJA)	says,		 x	and	y	disagree	with	respect	to	their	attitudes/utterances	just	in	case	the	accuracy	of	one	precludes	the	accuracy	of	the	other.		
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Another	formulation	(2007:	24)	says	that	x	and	y	disagree	in	the	target	sense	just	in	case	“the	acceptance	and	the	rejection	cannot	 both	be	accurate.”12		For	the	case	of	contingent	claims	uttered	by	x	and	y,	 these	two	explications	are	meant	 to	come	to	the	 same	 thing.	 	Nothing	 theoretical	 is	 added	to	 this	 target	 sense	of	disagreement	that	appears	to	beg	the	question	 in	 favor	of	relativism	over	contextualism	(or	vice	versa).			The	contextualist	and	relativist	disagree	about	which	notion	of	accuracy	matters	for	the	 truth	 or	 falsity	 of	 epistemic	 modal	 claims.	 	 Do	 we	 evaluate	 modal	 epistemic	claims	relative	to	simply	a	world	as	our	contextualist	will	argue,	or	relative	to	both	a	world	and	the	assessor’s	information	state	as	a	MacFarlanean	relativist	will	argue?		Or	is	there	some	other	circumstance	that	matters?		Let	us	assume	with	MacFarlane	that	 answers	 to	 these	 questions	 are	 reflected	 in	 the	 empirical	 data---and	 in	particular	 by	where	we	 judge	 the	 presence	 of	 joint	 accuracy.	 	 Then	we	 need	 only	uncover	 the	 notion	 of	 accuracy	 that	 best	 accommodates	 those	 judgments	 once	surveyed.			
3.	Disagreement	Intuitions	Surveyed	We	 designed	 two	 studies	 to	 test	 native	 English	 speakers’	 judgments	 about	 the	presence	of	epistemic	modal	disagreement,	 in	the	sense	of	“disagreement”	 that	we	have	 been	 discussing.	 	 We	 varied	 the	 conversation	 relation	 between	 x	 and	 y---testing	 for	 disagreement	 in	 intra-conversational	 and	 various	 inter-conversational	circumstances.	 	 Specifically,	 we	 placed	 x	 and	 y	 in	 ordinary	 conversational,	 local	eavesdropping,	remote	eavesdropping,	and	completely	independent	conversational	circumstances.		In	the	first	study	we	employ	only	cleaned	up	versions	of	cases	from	the	 literature	 on	 epistemic	 modals---cases	 that	 have	 been	 used	 to	 motivate	contextualism	or	 relativism.	 	 	 In	 the	 second	study	we	 aim	 for	more	objectivity	 by	first	 diversifying	 the	 subject	 matter	 (and	 setting)	 of	 the	 epistemic	 modal	conversations	 while	 holding	 the	 conversational	 relation	 fixed,	 and	 second,	 by	diversifying	the	conversational	relation	while	holding	the	subject	matter	and	setting	fixed.					
																																																								12	MacFarlane	(2007:	24;	2009:	11-12)	acknowledges	that	these	explications	of	disagreement	are	difficult	to	elucidate	further	to	handle	special	cases	where	it	is	impossible	for	both	parties	to	be	accurate	just	because	it	is	impossible	for	one	of	the	parties	to	be	accurate.		Some	such	cases	are	a	problem	since	they	are	not	intuitively	judged	to	constitute	a	disagreement---for	instance,	when	I	claim,	“The	cat	is	on	the	mat.”	and	you	claim,	“Hesperus	is	not	Phosphorus.”	we	do	not	seem	to	disagree,	even	though	it	is	not	possible	for	both	claims	to	be	accurate.	Our	study	will	not	concern	such	special	cases,	since	we	restrict	our	discussion	to	the	contents	of	attitudes	and	utterances	that	have	their	truth	values	contingently.	
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All	vignettes	for	both	studies	contained	cues	to	tip	off	the	subjects	to	the	epistemic	readings	of	the	modals,	including	indications	that	epistemic	states	were	the	reasons	for	assertion.13		After	highlighting	the	modal	utterances	of	both	speakers,	we	asked,		“Do	you	agree	it	is	possible	in	this	case	for	both	of	their	claims	to	be	true	(at	the	same	time)?”		The	wording	 ensures	 that	 the	 subjects	 are	 evaluating	 for	 a	 state	 of	 disagreement	(and	 not	 an	 activity	 of	 disagreeing).	 	 It	 also	 makes	 clear	 that	 we	 are	 not	 asking	whether	or	not	the	subjects	are	merely	justified.				Subjects	self-reported	their	native	language,	and	we	excluded	the	data	of	those	who	reported	 anything	 other	 than	 English.	 Because	 subjects	 were	 not	 excluded	 from	completing	 the	 experiment	 on	 the	 basis	 of	 native	 language,	 there	 would	 be	 no	incentive	to	lie	about	it.	Of	course,	this	being	an	internet-based	survey,	we	cannot	be	certain	that	all	of	the	subjects	were	telling	the	truth	about	their	native	language.	The	same	 is	 true,	 however,	 of	most	 traditional	 in-person	 survey	 protocols;	we	 rely	on	subjects	 to	 be	 honest.	 No	 other	 demographic	 information	 was	 gathered;	 this	 is	because	we	expected	subjects	would	be	less	likely	to	participate	in	an	online	survey	that	 requested	 extensive	 demographic	 information,	 and	 because	 gathering	 more	information	may	have	required	IRB	approval.		We	ran	two	screening	questions,	which	were	used	to	disqualify	some	subjects.	This	was	done	with	one	narrative,	(Ticket	Cost),	involving	a	clear	disagreement	about	the	precise	 amount	 paid	 by	 x	 and	 y	 for	 their	 flight	 to	 Puerto	 Rico,14	and	 a	 second	narrative,	 (Indexical	 Claims),	 involving	 indexical	 utterances	 that	 were	 obviously	compatible	(viz.,	x	saying,	“I’m	hungry”,	and	y	replying,	“I’m	not	hungry”).		Subjects	that	missed	 the	 obvious	 answer	 to	 the	 disagreement-question	 for	 either	 of	 these	two	 narratives	 were	 eliminated	 from	 the	 study.	 These	 screening	 questions	 had	several	purposes.	First,	the	clear-disagreement	question	was	used	to	make	sure	that	subjects	 understood	 the	 questions	 to	 be	 about	 compatibility,	 rather	 than	justification.	 Second,	 these	questions	were	used	 to	eliminate	 subject	with	a	strong	bias	 to	 respond	with	 either	 agreement	 or	 disagreement	 regardless	 of	 the	 context.	And	 finally,	 the	 questions	were	 used	 to	 exclude	 subjects	who	 just	weren’t	 paying	attention	or	cooperating.			
Study	#1	This	MTurk	 study	 included	 four	 vignettes:	 (Fred),	 (Boston),	 (Bus	 Stop)	 and	 (FBI).	There	were	 265	 admissible	 subjects,	 each	 receiving	 the	 two	 screen	 questions	 (in	random	 order)	 and	 one	 of	 the	 four	 test	 questions.	 We	 begin	 with	 the	 case	 of																																																									13	One	further	way	to	ensure	an	epistemic,	rather	than	counterfactual,	reading	would	be	to	use	“may”	rather	than	“might”.		“May”	is	more	difficult	to	hear	non-epistemically.		Our	study	could	be	improved	by	this	modification	to	the	questions.				14	That	question	was	used	in	Study	2,	while	a	similar	clear	dispute	about	the	precise	date	of	a	friend’s	birthday	was	presented	in	Study	1.		
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(Fred).15		 It	 is	 the	 kind	 of	 case	 that	 both	 Kratzer	 and	 DeRose	 use	 to	 motivate	contextualist	treatments	of	epistemic	modals.				 (FRED)	Suppose	a	man	is	approaching	both	of	us.		You	and	I	are	not	together,	and	you	are	much	closer	to	him	than	I	am.		I	can	only	see	the	bare	outlines	of	this	man.		I	say	to	myself,	"That	person	might	be	Fred".	You	on	the	other	hand,	being	much	closer	 to	 this	 man,	 are	 thinking,	 "That	 person	 can’t	 be	 Fred.	 	I	 know	 Fred	doesn’t	have	a	mustache."				
• I	said:	"That	person	might	be	Fred."	
• Your	thought	was:	"That	person	can’t	be	Fred."		Question:	In	this	case,	my	claim	and	your	claim	can	both	be	true	(at	the	same	time).	Do	you	agree	or	disagree?		In	(Fred)	we	find	two	subjects	independently	seeking	the	same	person,	Fred.		They	are	 not	 in	 contact	 with	 one	 another.	 	 This	 however	 does	 not	 beg	 any	 questions	against	MacFarlane,	because---as	we	noted---disagreement	 is	 a	 state	 that	does	not	essentially	 involve	 an	 activity	 between	 two	 or	 more	 persons.	 	 Whether	 the	 two	parties	are	involved	in	the	same	conversation	is	irrelevant	to	whether	they	are	in	a	state	of	disagreement.				So,	are	the	two	subjects	disagreeing	in	(Fred)?	Contextualism,	ala	Kratzer	or	DeRose,	predict	NO.	 	The	position	predicts	 that	both	claims	can	be	true	(at	 the	same	time),	since	 the	 truth	 values	 of	 the	 two	 modal	 claims	 depend	 on	 distinct	 utterance	contexts.	 	The	 contexts	 importantly	differ	on	 the	 relevant	 information	available	 to	the	 subjects.	 	 By	 constrast,	 MacFarlane’s	 relativistic	 version	 of	 PJA	 predicts	disagreement	 between	 the	 claims	of	 the	 two	parties.	 	 Relative	 to	 any	 one	 state	 of	assessment	only	one	of	the	two	parties	can	be	right.		So	qua	assessor,	the	informant	is	predicted,	according	to	relativistic-PJA,	to	intuit	a	disagreement	between	them.				Responses	to	the	questions		were	analyzed	for	statistical	significance	using	a	logistic	regression	model.16		What	we	find	 is	 that	 informants	agree	that	both	speakers	can																																																									15	Modified	from	Kratzer	(1986:	9)		Our	narrative	differs	from	her	version	in	that	we	do	not	suggestively	build	the	contextualist	answer	to	the	question	into	the	narrative.		See	Nat	Hansen	(2011)	for	discussion	of	this	confound	as	it	appears	in	the	epistemic	contextualist	literature.		16	Generally	speaking,	this	is	a	model	that	investigates	the	effect	of	some	experimental	manipulation	on	the	likelihood	of	a	response	variable.	In	a	logistic	or	logit	model,	the	response	is	binary	(yes/no).	In	this	case,	the	experimental	manipulations	are	the	various	forms	of	the	modal	question,	and	the	binary	response	variable	is	agree/disagree.	What	we	model	here	is	how	particular	modal	questions	affect	the	likelihood	of	subjects’	responding	‘agree’.	In	particular,	this	model	takes	as	its	dependent	variable	the	log	odds	(or	logit)	of	an	‘agree’	response.	This	is	the	
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be	right	about	62%	of	the	time,	a	level	significantly	above	chance:	b	=	0.489,	z	=	2.00,	p	 <	 0.05.	 	 If	 the	 judgments	 about	 disagreement	 are	 tracking	 a	 preclusion	 of	 joint	accuracy,	 then	 the	 results	 do	 not	 favor	 a	 relativist	 reading,	 but	 do	 favor	 a	contextualist	reading	of	accuracy.			We	 turn	now	 to	 (Boston).	 	 It	 is	 the	kind	of	 case	 that	MacFarlane	uses	 to	motivate	relativist	treatments	of	epistemic	modals.17				 (BOSTON)	Sally	and	George	are	discussing	Joe's	whereabouts.	Sally	says,	"Joe	might	be	in	Boston."		George	replies,	"Joe	can’t	be	in	Boston.	I	 just	had	breakfast	with	him	here	in	Los	Angeles	30	minutes	ago."		
• Sally	said:	"Joe	might	be	in	Boston."	
• George	replied:	"Joe	can’t	be	in	Boston."		Question:	In	this	case,	Sally's	claim	and	George's	claim	can	both	be	true	(at	the	same	time).	Do	you	agree	or	disagree?		A	 natural	 non-solipsistic	 contextualism	 will	 predict	 a	 disagreement	 here.	 	 So	 it	predicts	disagreement	with	the	claim	that	both	parties	can	be	right.	 	After	all,	non-solipsistic	contextualism	allows	that	the	context	of	utterance	is	broad	enough	in	an	ordinary	conversational	setting	to	make	relevant	the	information	that	is	available	to	the	conversational	participants	collectively.		On	this	understanding	Sally	and	George	each	make	claims	about	the	same	body	of	information.		Of	course,	relativism	agrees	with	the	verdict	but	 for	a	different	reason.	 	Relativism	predicts	 that	our	 informant	will	 evaluate	 both	modal	 claims	 against	 her	 own	 body	 of	 information.	 	Whatever	that	 information	happens	 to	be,	one	party	will	be	wrong	 if	 the	other	 is	 right.	 	 For	either	Bill’s	being	in	Boston	is	compatible	with	her	information	or	it	is	not.	 	Hence,	the	speakers	cannot	both	be	right	(at	the	same	time).				Here	we	find	that	only	37%	of	informants	agree	that	the	speakers	can	both	be	right,	significantly	less	often	than	chance:	b	=	-0.533,	z	=	-2.20,	p	<	0.05.		The	tendency	to	agree	 that	 both	 parties	 can	 be	 right	 here	 is	 significantly	 below	 (Fred).	 	 It	 is	 also	significantly	below	(Bus	Stop),	which	we	discuss	below:	b	>	1,	z	>	2.5,	p	<	0.01	for	both	comparisons.	 	So	the	result	 is	a	 tendency	toward	disagreement	 in	(Boston).18																																																																																																																																																																							natural	logarithm	of	(	p	(agree)	/	p	(¬agree)	).	In	what	follows,	results	are	reported	with	a	coefficient	b,	which	is	the	size	of	the	effect	in	log	odds;	a	z	score,	also	known	as	a	Wald	z	statistic;	and	a	p-value,	the	probability	of	type	I	error	(rejecting	a	true	null	hypothesis)	associated	with	the	Wald	test	statistic.	17	Modified	from	MacFarlane	(2011)	18	The	comparison	between	(Boston)	and	(FBI),	presented	below,	does	not	reach	statistical	significance.		
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That	result	 is	consistent	with	relativism,	but	 it	also	consistent	with	non-solipsistic	contextualism.			Let	us	now	look	at	(Bus	Stop),	which	is	a	case	of	local	eavesdropping.	 	Preliminary	surveys	 revealed	 that	 subjects	were	 heavily	 distracted	 by	 cases	 like	MacFarlane’s	that	 had	 eavesdroppers	 jumping	 out	 of	 closets.	 	 So	 we	 tested	 this	 more	 natural	example:				 (Bus	Stop)		Sally	arrived	at	the	bus	stop	a	bit	late	with	her	friend	Betty.	Sally	worries,	"We	might	have	missed	our	bus."		A	bystander,	George,	is	quietly	eavesdropping.	He	mutters	 to	 himself,	 "They	 can’t	 have	missed	 their	 bus.	 I’ve	 been	 here	 for	 an	hour	and	know	that	the	bus	has	not	yet	arrived."		
• Sally	said:	"We	might	have	missed	our	bus."	
• George	muttered:	"They	can’t	have	missed	their	bus."		Question:	In	this	case,	Sally's	claim	and	George's	claim	can	both	be	true	(at	the	same	time).	Do	you	agree	or	disagree?		Contextualists	 who	 by	 default	 treat	 only	 the	 knowledge	 of	 the	 conversational	participants	 as	 relevant	will	 predict	 here	 no	 disagreement---that	 the	 subjects	 can	both	 be	 right.	 	 After	 all,	 Sally	 and	 George	 are	 not	 part	 of	 the	 same	 conversation.		Relativists	by	contrast	will	once	again	predict	a	disagreement.		Again,	they	say	that	Sally	and	George	cannot	both	be	right	from	any	one	point	of	assessment.				74%	of	the	time	our	subjects	agree	that	both	parties	can	be	right,	significantly	above	chance:	b	=	1.030,	z	=	3.01,	p	<	0.001.		The	result	is	predicted	by	contextualism,	but	not	relativism.		We	find	significantly	more	agreement	here	than	in	(Boston),	which,	recall,	had	an	effect	in	the	direction	of	intuited	disagreement.				What	happens	in	cases	of	remote	eavesdropping?19		For	instance,			 (FBI)	Sally	and	George	are	having	a	conversation	at	home	and	discussing	Joe's	whereabouts.	FBI	Agent	Frank	has	planted	a	bug,	and	from	headquarters	is	eavesdropping	on	their	conversation:	George:	"Do	you	know	where	Joe	is?"		Sally:	"No	I	don't.	But	he	might	be	in	Boston.	He	considered	going	there	for	an	important	meeting."		FBI	Agent	Frank	(to	a	colleague	at	headquarters):	"Joe	can't	be	in	Boston.	Our	guys	arrested	Joe	in	Los	Angeles	20	minutes	ago."																																																										19	The	example	here	is	modified	from	Crispin	Wright	(2007).	
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• Sally	said:	"[Joe]	might	be	in	Boston."	
• Agent	Frank	Replied:	"Joe	can't	be	in	Boston."	Question:		In	this	case,	Sally's	claim	and	Agent	Frank's	claim	can	both	be	true	(at	the	same	time).		Do	you	agree	or	disagree?		There	are	expressions	of	skepticism	about	MacFarlane’s	claim	that	 there	 is	a	clear	intuition	of	disagreement	in	(remote)	eavesdropping	cases.20		And	the	contextualist	of	 course	 would	 deny	 disagreement	 here	 and	 predict	 a	 pattern	 of	 subjects	 who	agree	that	Sally	and	Agent	Frank	can	both	be	right.		What	do	our	results	show?			The	 result	 does	 support	 the	 conclusion	 that	 remote	 eavesdropping	 cases	 are	 not	obvious	cases	of	disagreement.		Our	informants	did	not	know	what	to	make	of	(FBI),	with	almost	exactly	50%	agreeing	that	both	speakers	can	be	right.	Comparisons	to	(Fred)	and	(Boston)	here,	 though	on	the	order	of	10-15%	difference,	do	not	reach	statistical	 significance.	 (FBI)	 does,	 however,	 elicit	 significantly	 fewer	 ‘agree’	responses	than	(Bus	Stop):	b	=	1.030,	z	=	-2.63,	p	<	0.01.	In	other	words,	subjects	are	as	likely	to	intuit	 ‘agree’	here	as	they	are	to	detect	a	dispute,	but	not	as	often	as	in	our	local	eavesdropping	case,	(Bus	Stop).	It	is	not	clear	why	the	two	eavesdropping	cases	 should	differ	 significantly	 in	 this	way.	One	 possibility	 is	 that	 is	 that	 (FBI)	 is	inherently	a	more	adversarial	context	than	(Bus	Stop).	For	instance,	FBI	agents	are	likely	 to	disagree	with	people	 they	 are	 pursuing	 or	 investigating.	 If	 the	difference	really	 is	 due	 to	 idiosyncratic	 properties	 of	 the	 specific	 subject	 matter	 used	 here,	future	investigation	of	a	greater	variety	of	contexts	should	bear	this	out.			Moreover,	remote	eavesdroppers,	unlike	local	eavesdroppers,	are	predictably	adversarial			The	next	study,	presented	below,	uses	a	wider	variety	of	contexts	and	finds	no	such	significant	 difference	 between	 local	 and	 remote	 eavesdropping	 cases,	 and	 shows	that	 non-modal	 subject-matter	 does	 have	 a	 significant	 affect	 on	 epistemic	 modal	judgments.			An	 alternative	 explanation	 of	 the	 randomness	 of	 the	 (FBI)	 result	 might	 be	foreshadowed	by	von	Fintel	and	Gillies	(2011)	and	Kratzer	(2009),	who	advocate	a	special	 brand	 of	 flexible	 contextualism	 that	 predicts	 indeterminacy	 in	eavesdropping	 cases	 owing,	 as	 Kratzer	 puts	 it,	 “to	 the	 absence	 of	 any	 overt	 or	contextually	suggested	relativization.”		However,	a	question	remains	about	why	we	would	 not	 find	 an	 analogous	 randomness	 for	 (Bus	 Stop),	 the	 local	 eavesdropping	case.	 	Barring	further	study,	the	indeterminacy	view	would	have	to	explain	how	an	increase	in	the	distance	of	an	eavesdropper	leads	to	a	decrease	in	the	overtness	of		contextual	 relativization.	However,	 as	 suggested	 Study	 2	 below,	 there	 really	 is	 no	significant	 difference	 between	 remote	 and	 local	 eavesdropping	 judgments,	 so	perhaps	the	indeterminacy	view	is	relieved	of	that	explanatory	burden.																																																													20	Versions	of	the	criticism	appear	in	Kai	von	Fintel	and	Tony	Gillies	(2008:	79,	81)	Kratzer	(2009:	Slide	68),	Hawthorne	(2007),	et.	al.			
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Let	 us	 sum	 up	 the	 findings	 and	 lessons	 of	 Study	 1.	 	 The	 primary	 lesson	 is	 that	MacFarlanean	 relativism	 overgenerates	 epistemic	 modal	 disagreement.	 	 It	mistakenly	 predicts	 that	 (Fred),	 (Bus	 Stop),	 and	 (FBI)	 are	 all	 cases	 of	 intuitive	dispute,	while	the	empirical	data	does	not	bear	this	out.		Relativist-PJA	is	not	what	is	tracked	 by	 competent	 informants’	 judgement	 about	 the	 cases.	 Dialectically,	contextualism	 is	 then	 in	 good	 standing.	 	 It	 is	 treated,	 even	 by	MacFarlane,	 as	 the	default	position.		Without	the	amount	of	disagreement	that	MacFarlane	predicts,	the	argument	 from	 disagreement	 fails	 because	 its	 presupposed	 data	 is	 not	 robust.	Contextualism	is	then	unmoved	from	its	default	status.				That	said,	Study	1	by	itself	does	not	fully	support	contextualism	either.	Although	a	non-solipsistic	 contextualism	predicts	 the	 first	 three	 results,	 (Fred),	 (Boston)	 and	(Bus	 Stop),	 it	 does	 not	predict	 the	 (FBI)	 result.	 	 	 So	 although	 local	 eavesdropping	result	for	(Bus	Stop)	is	evidence	for	the	contextualist	prediction,	(FBI),	our	remote	eavesdropping	example,	is	not	evidence	for	contextualism.		In	(FBI)	subjects	were	as	likely	 to	 intuit	disagreement	as	 they	were	agreement.	We	have	suggested	that	 this	may	be	due	 to	 the	 inherently	adversarial	nature	of	 the	 (FBI)	 scenario,	or	possible	the	adversarial	nature	of	remote	eavesdropping	of	any	kind.	 	We	chose	 in	 the	 first	study	 to	 test	 cleaned	 up	 versions	 of	 examples	 already	 operating	 in	 the	 literature.		For	 those	 are	 among	 the	 familiar	 cases	 that	 have	 been	 used	 to	 motivate	 the	contextualist	and	relativist	positions,	and	it	is	those	specific	motivations	that	we	are	evaluating.		Study	2	by	contrast	aims	for	minimal	sequences	to	flesh	out	the	affects	of	non-modal	subject	matter	on	studies	like	Study	1.					
Study	#2	In	 the	 second	 study	we	 duplicated	 from	 Study	 1	 the	 format	 of	 the	 test	 questions.	However,	 we	 aimed	 to	 diversify	 the	 conversational	 relation	 while	 holding	 the	subject-matter	 (and	 setting	 fixed)	 and	 aimed	 to	 diversify	 the	 subject-matter	 (and	setting)	of	the	conversations	while	holding	the	conversational	relation	fixed.		There	were	four	conversational	relations	(i)	normal	conversation,	which	involves	x	and	y	in	the	 same	conversation,	 (ii)	unrelated	conversations,	which	 involves	x	and	y	 in	 two	independent	conversations	with	neither	speaker	involved	with	the	other,	(iii)	local	
eavesdropping,	 which	 involves	 a	 nearby	 listener,	 and	 (iv)	 remote	 eavesdropping,	involving	 a	 listener	 that	 is	 not	 in	 a	 position	 to	 join	 the	 original	 speaker	 in	conversation.				For	 each	 of	 the	 four	 conversational	 relations	 there	were	 four	 scenarios	 regarding	overall	subject-matter	of	conversation	and	environment	in	which	the	conversation	occurred---specifically,	utterances	(a)	in	a	coffee	shop	about	a	performer,	(b)	at	the	bus	stop	about	the	arrival	of	the	bus,	(c)	in	the	class	room	regarding	the	passing	of	a	math	test,	and	(d)	 in	 the	setting	of	an	academic	 journal	regarding	research	on	the	origins	of	the	Mesoamericans.					
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We	 conducted	 four	 distinct	 questionnaires	 (via	 MTurk),	 each	 included	 the	 two	screen	 questions	 plus	 four	 test	 questions.	 No	 one	 study	 duplicated	 either	 a	conversational	 relation	 or	 an	 environmental	 scenario.	 	 So	 every	 conversational	relation	and	every	 environmental	 scenario	were	 represented	once	 in	 every	 study,	with	 no	 subjects	 taking	more	 than	 one	 study.	 	 There	were	 between	 120	 and	 150	admissible	 native	 English	 subjects	 in	 each	 of	 the	 four	 questionnaires	 (after	eliminating	 for	over-generation	or	under-generation	of	disagreement	 in	 the	screen	questions).21			Study	2	was	analyzed	with	a	mixed-effects	 logistic	regression	model	using	crossed	random	effects	of	subject	and	subject-matter.			Our	general	findings	are	that,	with	a	few	 exceptions,	 (1)	 subjects’	 likelihoods	 of	 judging	 epistemic	modal	 disagreement	are	not	much	different	from	chance;	(2)	differences	in	conversational	relation	(e.g.,	normal	 conversation	 vs	 eavesdropping)	 do	 not	 affect	 the	 likelihood	 of	 these	judgments;	 and	 (3)	 situational	 differences	 (i.e.,	 those	 differences	 in	 non-modal	subject-matter	 and	 setting	 of	 the	 vignettes)	 do	 affect	 the	 likelihood	 of	 such	judgments.		We	discuss	these	in	that	order.				First,	 crossing	 the	parameters	on	 the	question	of	whether	our	 subjects	detected	a	genuine	dispute,	the	results	were	not	much	difference	from	chance	(0.5).		Although,	6	 of	 the	 16	 modal	 questions	 do	 elicit	 response	 patterns	 that	 differ	 from	 chance	(boldfaced	in	the	chart	below):			
 Normal	 			Unrelated		 	 Local	 	 					Remote	Conversation				Conversations	 Eavesdropping			Eavesdropping	
 Coffee	 	 0.4545455		 			0.3596491			 0.3846154		 					0.376	MathTest	 0.4473684		 			0.4090909		 	 0.4		 	 					0.4380952	BusStop	 0.5428571		 			0.5322581		 	 0.5545455											0.5526316	Academic	 0.64		 	 			0.5714286	 	 0.5087719		 					0.6727273		The	screening	questions	were	more	clear-cut.	The	percentage	of	subjects	detecting	dispute	for	the	modal	questions	ranges	from	36%	to	67%.		By	contrast,	for	the	non-modal	screening	questions,	only	24%	judged	no	dispute	to	an	obvious	disagreement	(Ticket	Cost),	and	97%	claimed	no	dispute	for	an	obvious	non-dispute	in	(Indexical	Claims).	 This	 reflects	 the	 fact	 that	 intuitions	 are	 less	 consistent	 across	 subjects	evaluating	 for	 modal	 disagreement	 than	 they	 are	 at	 evaluating	 for	 non-modal	disagreement.	 In	 other	 words,	 these	 are	 much	more	 difficult	 judgments	 than	 the	obvious	cases	used	in	the	screening.				 																																																									21	As	 expected,	 almost	 all	 subjects,	 around	95%,	 agreed	 that	 in	 (Indexical	 Claims)	both	x	and	y	may	speak	the	truth,	and	most	subjects,	approximately	73%,	correctly	denied	in	(Ticket	Cost)	that	both	may	speak	the	truth.	 	Hence,	a	strong	majority	of	subjects	appear	to	be	relatively	attentive.			
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4	of	 the	6	questions	 that	do	 reflect	 results	better	 than	chance	are	 consistent	with	what	 would	 be	 predicted	 by	 a	 non-solipsistic	 conversational-participants	contextualism.	 	 Those	 were	 (Coffee,	 Unrelated	 Conversations),	 (Coffee,	 Local	Eavesdropping)	and	(Coffee,	Remote	Eavesdropping),	all	of	which	lean	significantly	toward	 “no	 disagreement”,	 and	 	 (Academic,	 Normal	 Conversation),	 which	 leans	significantly	toward	“disagreement”.		3	of	the	6	questions	that	reflect	results	better	than	 chance	 are	 consistent	 with	 what	 would	 be	 predicated	 by	 the	 relativist.		(Academic,	Normal	Conversation),	(Academic,	Local	Eavesdropping)	and	(Academic,	Remote	 Eavesdropping),	 all	 of	 which	 lean	 significantly	 toward	 “disagreement”.		However,	 the	preponderance	of	results	are	evidence	 for	neither	“disagreement”	or	“no	 disagreement”,	 and	 suggests,	 for	 a	 truth	 conditional	 semanticist,	 that	 either	there	 is	 widespread	 indeterminacy	 of	 content	 or	 massive	 interference	 perhaps	owing	to	situation	effects	of	the	cases.				The	 second	 general	 finding	 is	 that	 the	 linguistic	 relation	 does	 not	 affect	 the	likelihood	 of	 detecting	 epistemic	 modal	 dispute.	 Here	 are	 the	 percentages	 of	subjects	judging	a	disagreement	across	linguistic	conditions:		
Across	Linguistic	Relations		Normal	 			Unrelated		 	 Local	 	 								Remote	Conversation				Conversations	 Eavesdropping						Eavesdropping	0.52		 	 			0.47			 	 0.46		 	 								0.51		These	percentages	do	not	favor	the	raw	predictions	of	any	of	the	theories	we	have	been	discussing.	For	 instance,	a	conversational-group	contextualism	would	predict	that	eavesdropping	would	elicit	a	notable	decrease	in	subject’s	inclination	to	detect	a	 dispute	 as	 compared	 to	 a	 normal	 conversational	 setting.	 There	 is	 only	 one	significant	 difference	 along	 the	 scale	 shown	 above:	 subjects	 are	 significantly	 less	likely	to	judge	disagreement	across	unrelated	conversations	than	between	speakers	in	 a	 normal	 conversation:	 b	 =	 -0.34,	 z	 =	 -2.10,	 p	 =	 0.036.	 The	 less	 reasonable	solipsistic	 contextualism,	 however,	 would	 predict	 little	 differences	 across	conversational	 relations,	 predicting	 no	 disagreement	 in	 any	 case,	 including	 in	 the	normal	conversational	environment.		And	relativism	would	share	the	expectation	of	little	 difference,	 but	 in	 the	 opposite	 direction---predicting	 disagreement	 across	 all	the	conversational	types.		However,	this	aspect	of	the	data	supports	neither	position.	The	disagreement	judgments	are	generally	not	significantly	more	or	less	likely	than	chance	 for	 any	 given	 linguistic	 condition.	 So	 the	 data	 generally	 supports	 neither	disagreement	nor	no-disagreement	for	any	given	linguistic	relation.			The	third	general	finding	is	that	there	are	significant	situation	effects	.	In	particular	we	 found	 that	 the	 (Academic	 Conversation)	 and	 (Bus	 Stop)	 results	 showed	 an	increased	 tendency	 to	 acknowledge	 dispute	 as	 compared	 to	 the	 (Math	 Test)	 and	(Coffee	Shop)	results,	independently	of	the	linguistic	relation	between	the	speakers.				
	Across	Subject	Matters/Settings	
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	CoffeeShop		 			MathTest		 			BusStop		 			Academic	0.39		 	 			0.42			 			0.55			 			0.60		Like	 with	 (FBI)	 in	 Study	 1,	 (Academic	 Conversation)	 may	 carry	 an	 increased	tendency	 to	 acknowledge	 dispute	 because	 of	 its	 inherently	 adversarial	 nature.		Academics	in	journals	typically	disagree	with	the	colleagues	they	are	engaging	and	debating.		The	pattern	developing	is	that	adversarial	subject-matters/settings	carry	an	 increased	 tendency	 toward	 judging	 epistemic	 modal	 dispute.	 	 This	 perhaps	explains	 the	oddity	 in	our	eavesdropping	 results	 in	Study	1.	 	There	we	 found	 that	the	remote	eavesdropping	(FBI)	result	came	back	with	significantly	fewer	subjects	agreeing	 that	 both	 parties	 may	 speak	 the	 truth,	 as	 compared	 to	 the	 local	eavesdropping	(Bus	Stop)	result.				Here	is	the	Study	2	data	in	chart	form:		
		In	 the	 above	 chart,	 “intra-conversation”	 refers	 to	 what	 we	 have	 been	 calling	 a	“normal	conversation”,	and	“inter-conversation”	refers	to	what	we	have	been	calling	independent	or	“unrelated	conversation.”		0	corresponds	to	chance	(50%	agreement	that	 the	 two	 parties	 can	 simultaneously	 speak	 the	 truth),	 negative	 numbers	correspond	 to	 lower	 than	 chance	 agreement	 (i.e.,	 tendency	 toward	 “no	disagreement”),	and	positive	numbers	correspond	to	higher	than	chance	agreement	(i.e.,	 tendency	 toward	 “disagreement”).	 	 Error	 bars	 represent	 the	 95%	 confidence	intervals.	
 That	 differences	 in	 subject-matter	 have	 an	 effect	 on	 epistemic	 modal	 judgments	should	be	surprising	to	both	contextualists	and	relativists.	 	That	is	because	neither	framework	 antecedently	 has	 resources	 to	 explain	 such	 differences.	 	 Instead,	 they	predict	 that	 disagreement	 judgments	 essentially	 on	 variations	 in	 the	 epistemic	











































states	 of	 the	 relevant	 subjects,	 and	 not	 on	 objective	 features	 of	 the	 non-modal	subject-matter	under	discussion.			Like	with	the	 first	study,	Study	2	does	not	generally	support	relativist	predictions.	Only	 two	 of	 the	 sixteen	 test	 questions	 came	 back	 with	 results	 consistent	 with	relativism	 while	 inconsistent	 with	 contextualism,	 and	 those	 both	 involved	“adversarial”	 academic	 dispute	 scenarios.	 	 That	 non-modal	 subject	 matter	 in	particular,	 as	 compared	 to	 many	 other	 non-modal	 subject	 matters,	 carries	 a	principled	bias	towards	disagreement.				The	 primary	 conclusion	we	 draw	 is	 that	 disagreement	 intuitions	 are	 not	 after	 all	tracking	relativistic-PJA.	 Indeed,	Study	2	suggests	 that	ordinary	people	may	not	be	easily	 tracking	 any	 notion	 of	 joint	 accuracy	 in	 this	 domain.	 	 Otherwise,	 their	responses	would	be	more	uniform.			Recall	our	understanding	of	MacFarlane’s	position:	 	 if	(i)	his	disagreement	data	 is	robust	 and	 (ii)	 the	 disagreement	 intuitions	 that	 motivate	 expanding	 the	 relevant	group	of	knowers	at	all	motivates	expanding	the	relevant	group	to	include	anybody	who	will	ever	consider	the	claim,	then	contextualism	is	in	big	trouble.	 	In	section	3	we	questioned	(i)	at	length.		Since	MacFarlane’s	data	is	not	robust,	part	(ii)	loses	its	force.	 	 The	 contextualist	 semantics,	 as	 the	 default	 position,	 only	 needs	 to	accommodate	 clear	 cases	 of	 genuine	 dispute.	 	What	we	 learned	 is	 that	 not	many	cases	 from	 the	 relativist	 repertoire	 and	 even	 fewer	 cases	 from	 Study	 2	 fit	 that	description.	 	 To	 that	 extent	 the	 most	 fundamental	 motivation	 for	 relativism	 is	without	legs,	since	the	disagreement	data	does	not	favor	its	notion	of	joint	accuracy.				As	 a	 refutation	 of	 relativism,	 Study	 1	 and	 Study	 2	 are	 overly	 conservative	experiments.		Asking	a	subject	to	evaluate	the	linguistic	situation	in	the	way	that	we	did	 might	 indicate	 to	 the	 subject	 that	 it	 is	 the	 subject’s	 own	 background	 that	 is	relevant	for	determining	the	truth	values	of	the	epistemic	modal	claims.	 	In	such	a	case	 our	 way	 of	 asking	 the	 questions	 would	 then	 bias	 judgments	 in	 favor	 of	 the	relativist’s	 assessor-sensitive	 predictions.	 	 Relativism,	 after	 all,	 avows	 that	 our	subject	becomes	the	assessor.		Still,	no	such	bias	surfaced	in	the	results.				There	are	other	lessons	to	highlight	from	the	experiment.	 	Subjects	appear	to	have	great	trouble	evaluating	for	“preclusion	of	joint	accuracy”.		Why	would	this	be?	Is	it	that	epistemic	modal	disputes	(if	there	are	any)	are	simply	and	predictably	harder	to	 track	 than	 ordinary	 non-modal	 disputes?	 Study	 2,	 and	 its	 lack	 of	 consistency,	suggests	 that	 subjects	 may	 not	 be	 tracking	 epistemic	 modal	 dispute	 at	 all,	 but	instead	are	susceptible	to	situation	effects	of	the	narratives.			Perhaps	solipsism	has	something	to	say	here.	If	epistemic	modal	disagreement	were	sufficiently	 rare	 or	 impossible	 (as	 solipsistic	 contextualism	 would	 suggest),	 then	perhaps	subjects	would	be	just	a	little	baffled	and	would	be	simply	trying	to	do	their	best	to	make	sense	of	a	preclusion-of-joint-accuracy	study.		Of	course	this	raises	the	question	of	why	our	subjects	did	not	all	just	answer	‘they	can	both	be	right’	on	every	
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trial.	However,	if	the	notion	of	epistemic	modal	disagreement	is	not	well-formed	in	the	 first	place,	 then	 the	question	 that	we	are	asking	 is	 confusing.	And	 rather	 than	answering	the	straightforwardly	‘right’	way,	subjects	are	looking	for	ways	of	making	the	question	make	sense.				If	subjects	really	have	no	idea	how	to	respond	to	our	prompt,	for	whatever	reason,	then	 instead	 of	 trying	 to	 answer	 the	 question,	 subjects	 are	 just	 latching	 onto	whatever	extra-linguistic	world	knowledge	might	influence	the	prior	probability	of	disagreement	 happening	 (e.g.,	 academics	 and	 remote	 eavesdroppers	 are	 a	 priori	more	likely	to	disagree	with	the	people	they	are	listening	to).	And	these	effects	are	massive,	 the	 largest	 we	 found	 in	 the	 study.	 There	 is	 also	 a	 moderately	 robust	difference	between	normal-conversational	and	unrelated-conversational	judgments	(i.e.,	intra-	and	inter-conversational,	respectively,	on	the	chart),	but	it	is	dwarfed	by	the	effect	of	context.	This	means	that,	while	non-semantic	‘situational’	effects	are	the	largest	 and	most	 robust	 discovered	 in	 this	 experiment,	 we	 do	 still	 uncover	 some	generalizations	about	how	linguistic	relations	affect	the	preclusion	of	joint	accuracy.		People	can	judge	the	truth	or	falsity	of	epistemic	modal	constructions	when	given	a	clear	picture	of	contextual	common	ground,	but	asking	them	to	shift	 that	common	ground	 away	 from	 the	 context	where	 a	 sentence	was	 uttered	 to	 common	 ground	from	 a	 new	 context	 where	 either	 an	 eavesdropper	 or	 the	 people	 giving	 the	experiment	have	added	more	information	(in	order	to	compare	the	truth	conditions	of	 statements	made	 in	 the	 two	 contexts)	 is	 just	 too	 difficult	 a	 task	 for	 people	 to	perform.		Relatedly,	it	may	be	that	‘true	at	the	same	time’	is	not	a	predicate	that	applies	to	two	epistemic	modal	claims	that	were	made	in	different	epistemic	states.	For	instance,	if	the	index	of	evaluation	always	includes	the	speaker’s	own	epistemic	states	(perhaps	together	with	 other	 standard	 parameters	 like	worlds	 and	 times)	 then	 there	 is	 no	single	index	of	evaluation	relative	to	which	the	two	claims	are	true.	 	So	even	if	the	corresponding	 solipsistic	 PJA	 were	 the	 index	 of	 evaluation	 that	 matters	 for	 the	proper	evaluation	of	epistemic	modal	discourse,	subjects	might	be	very	confused	by	our	survey	questions.				The	picture	that	emerges	from	our	results	is	that	people	intuit	disagreement	more	often	 in	 direct	 conversational	 interactions	 than	 between	 people	 in	 unrelated	conversations	 (although	 judgments	 are	 not	 particularly	 clear	 in	 either	 case),	 and	intuitions	 are	 all	 over	 the	 place	 with	 regard	 to	 eavesdropping	 cases	 of	 any	 kind,	essentially	 tracking	 properties	 of	 the	 general	 context	 rather	 than	 anything	specifically	semantic.		
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